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Dividing a Graphical Cake
XIAOHUI BEI, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
WARUT SUKSOMPONG, University of Oxford, UK
We consider the classical cake-cutting problem where we wish to fairly divide a heterogeneous resource,
often modeled as a cake, among interested agents. Work on the subject typically assumes that the cake is
represented by an interval. In this paper, we introduce a generalized setting where the cake can be in the form
of the set of edges of an undirected graph. This allows us to model the division of road or cable networks.
Unlike in the canonical setting, common fairness criteria such as proportionality cannot always be satisfied
in our setting if each agent must receive a connected subgraph. We determine the optimal approximation of
proportionality that can be obtained for any number of agents with arbitrary valuations, and exhibit tight
guarantees for each graph in the case of two agents. In addition, when more than one connected piece per
agent is allowed, we establish the best egalitarianwelfare guarantee for each total number of connected pieces.
We also study a number of variants and extensions, including when approximate equitability is considered,
or when the item to be divided is undesirable (also known as chore division).
1 INTRODUCTION
Cake cutting refers to the problem of fairly allocating a divisible resource, often modeled as a
cake, among agents with varying preferences. The problem dates back to shortly after the end of
World War II [21] and, not surprisingly given its wide range of applications, still enjoys significant
attention in mathematics, computer science, economics, and political science to this day [10, 16,
17].
What does it mean for an allocation to be fair? Steinhaus [21] proposed the following definition
of fairness: if the cake is divided between n agents, each agent should receive a part that she values
at least 1/n of the entire cake. This definition became known as proportionality, and is one of the
most fundamental notions in the literature of fair division. In his seminal article, Steinhaus showed
that a proportional allocation can be found for any number of agents with arbitrary preferences
over the cake—Steinhaus’ method, which he attributed to Knaster and Banach, was later formu-
lated as a moving-knife procedure by Dubins and Spanier [13]. The procedure works by having a
referee move a knife over the cake from left to right. Whenever the left part has value 1/n of the
entire cake for one of the agents, the agent takes that part of the cake and leaves; the procedure
is then repeated among the remaining agents. In addition to ensuring proportionality, the Dubins-
Spanier protocol has the important property that it always allocates to every agent a connected
piece of the cake. Without this property, it may well be that an agent is presented with—in the
words of Stromquist [22]—a “union of crumbs”.
The proportionality guarantee of the Dubins-Spanier protocol holds for a variety of items that
one may wish to divide, since an item of any shape or form can be “projected” onto a line, which
we can then run the protocol on. However, the connectivity property does not necessarily translate
from the line back to the original shape. A simple illustrating example is when the item has the
shape of a ring (e.g., a donut or a ring road): projecting the ring onto a line and applying Dubins-
Spanier may result in an agent receiving disconnected pieces of the ring. For this example, the
difficulty can be circumvented by cutting the ring at an arbitrary point, stretching it into a line, and
running the protocol to achieve proportionality. Nevertheless, one may already begin to suspect
that this type of fix no longer works when the shapes get more complex.
In this paper, we consider a natural setting where the cake is represented by the set of edges
of an arbitrary undirected graph. The graph could correspond to a resource in the form of a net-
work, such as a road or power cable network. The canonical cake-cutting setting, where the cake
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is assumed to be the interval [0, 1], is a special case of our setting, with the graph consisting of a
single edge. In this generalized graphical setting, we show that proportionality cannot always be
attained if connectivity is required. Therefore, our goal in this work is to provide the best possi-
ble approximation of proportionality that can be achieved in each graph. As we will see, despite
allowing arbitrary graphs and agents’ preferences in our model, we can still obtain several strong
fairness guarantees. Furthermore, we study a number of variants and extensions, including when
each agent can get more than one connected piece, or when the item to be divided is undesirable
(often referred to as a chore).
1.1 Our Results
We assume throughout the paper that the agents are endowed with valuation functions that are
additive and normalized with each agent having value 1 for the whole cake; these assumptions
are standard in the cake-cutting literature [16]. We also assume that the pieces of cake that dif-
ferent agents receive may intersect in a finite number of points. Our formal model is described in
Section 2.
In Section 3, we provide general guarantees that hold for any number of agents. For n agents
with arbitrary valuations and any graph, we establish the existence of a connected allocation that
gives every agent a utility of at least 12n−1 . We also show that this bound is tight even when the
agents have identical valuations and the graph is a star with 2n − 1 edges. In addition, for every
specific star graph, we determine the optimal utility that can be guaranteed for each number of
agents.
In Section 4, we delve deeper into the case of two agents. While we know from Section 3 that
both agents can be guaranteed a utility of 1/3 in general, for certain graphs it is possible to do
better. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that the optimal guarantee for each graph is always either
1/3 or 1/2; the latter case corresponds to a proportional allocation. The classification depends on
a graph property that we call almost bridgeless—a graph satisfies this property if we can add an
edge so that the resulting graph contains no bridges, where a bridge refers to an edge that is not
contained in any cycle. We show that a guarantee of 1/2 can be obtained if the graph is almost
bridgeless, while 1/3 is the best possible guarantee otherwise.
Next, we strengthen the result that both agents can be guaranteed a utility of 1/3 for any graph
by establishing the existence of a connected allocation such that the first agent receives value at
least 1/2 and the second agent at least 1/3.More generally, we characterize all pairs (α , β) forwhich
there always exists a connected allocation that yields utility at least α and β to the first and second
agent, respectively. On the other hand, if we are only interested in giving utility α to one agent
and β to the other, and are willing to give up control over which agent receives which guarantee,
then additional pairs (α , β) become achievable—again, we give a complete characterization of all
such pairs. Moreover, we consider allocating more than one connected piece to each agent: we
show that for any positive integer k , both agents can be guaranteed a utility of 12 −
1
2·3k
if we allow
the agents to receive a total of k + 1 connected pieces, and this is tight. We also study approximate
equitability and prove the existence of a connected allocation for which the agents’ utilities differ
by no more than 1/3; we again establish the tightness of the bound.
Finally, in Section 5, we turn our attention to chore division. In the case of two agents there
is a simple reduction between the settings of cake and chores, so all of our results in Section 4
carry over to chore division. By contrast, when there are more than two agents, the relationship
between the two settings is much less clear. We show that there exists a connected allocation that
incurs cost at most 2n+1 for n ≤ 5, and that no better bound can be obtained for any n.
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We remark that all of our positive results are constructive: for each result, we exhibit a moving-
knife protocol that achieves the desired guarantee. Moreover, one can make these protocols dis-
crete, so that they only use the cut and evaluation queries allowed by the Robertson-Webb query
model in order to access the valuation functions of the agents [17].
1.2 Further Related Work
While our graphical cake model is new to the best of our knowledge, graphs have recently been
studied in the context of allocating indivisible items. In particular, the items correspond to vertices
of an undirected graph, and each agent must be allocated a connected subgraph of the graph. A
line of work has explored existence and complexity questions for several fairness notions, both in
the case of goods [5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 25] and chores [9].
Connectivity constraints are commonly considered in the cake-cutting literature, where each
agent is allocated a single subinterval of the interval cake [1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 19, 22–24]. Segal-Halevi
et al. [20] studied the fair division of land and introduced geometric constraints to the setting by
requiring that allocated pieces be of certain shape—such requirements are important since a long
but narrow piece of land is likely to be of little practical use. Similarly to our setting, a proportional
allocation does not always exist in the presence of these constraints, and the authors examined
the approximations of proportionality that can be obtained.
2 PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, 2, . . . ,n} be the set of agents, and G = (V , E) be a finite and connected undirected
graph representing the cake, with no loops but possibly with multiple edges joining the same pair
of vertices.1 Denote bym the number of edges. Each edge in E can be viewed as an interval of the
cake. For any points x ,y on an edge, we write [x ,y] or [y, x] to denote the interval of the cake
between x and y; we sometimes identify a vertex v ∈ V with the corresponding endpoint of the
edges adjacent to v .
A piece of cake is a finite union of disjoint intervals, where each interval is a subinterval of an
edge and the intervals in the piece may belong to different edges.2 A piece of cake is said to be
connected if for any two points in the piece, it is possible to get from one point to the other along the
graphG by only traversing this piece of cake. Each agent i has a nonnegative valuation function (or
utility function) fi , which specifies the agent’s value for each piece of cake. An instance consists of
the graphG , the agents, and their valuation functions. As is standard in the cake-cutting literature
[16], we assume that the valuation functions are
• normalized: the value of an agent for the entire cake is 1;
• divisible: for each interval [x ,y] and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, there is a point z ∈ [x ,y] such that fi ([x , z]) =
λ · fi ([x ,y]);
• additive: the value of an agent for a piece of cake is the sum of her values for the intervals
in the piece.
An allocation of the cake is denoted by a vector A = (A1, . . . ,An), where each Ai is a piece of
cake, and Ai and Aj are disjoint for all i , j . An allocation is said to be complete if the entire cake
1A loop can be represented in our model by adding a new vertex inside the loop, thereby breaking the loop into two edges
joining the same pair of vertices.
2As is commonly done in cake cutting, we assume that all intervals are closed intervals. Two intervals are said to be disjoint
if they intersect in at most one point, and two pieces of cake are said to be disjoint if they intersect in a finite number of
points. If we adopt the stricter convention that each point can only be allocated to one agent (so intervals can be open,
half-open, or closed) and two intervals are disjoint only if their intersection is empty, there are strong negative results. For
example, on a star graph, at most one agent would be able to receive intervals from more than one branch in a connected
allocation.
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is allocated, and connected if each Ai is a connected piece of cake. The egalitarian welfare of an
allocation is defined as mini ∈N fi (Ai ). An allocation is proportional if its egalitarian welfare is at
least 1/n. The inequity of an allocation is defined as maxi, j∈N | fi (Ai ) − fj (Aj )|; an allocation with
inequity 0 is said to be equitable.
We make analogous assumptions for chore division (Section 5). Each agent has a nonnegative
cost function fi for the chore, which is normalized, divisible, and additive. The egalitarian cost of
an allocation is defined as maxi ∈N fi (Ai ). Naturally, we require the entire chore to be allocated, so
we restrict our attention to complete allocations of the chore.
3 ANY NUMBER OF AGENTS
In this section, we present an egalitarian welfare guarantee that holds for any number of agents
and arbitrary graphs, and derive improved guarantees in the case where the graph is a star.
3.1 General Guarantees
We begin by showing that it is always possible to give every agent a utility of at least 12n−1 , and this
bound is tight. Similarly to the Dubins-Spanier protocol, our algorithm proceeds by identifying a
piece that is valuable enough for one agent but at the same time not too valuable for the other
agents, allocating such a piece to the former agent, and recursing on the latter agents.
Theorem 3.1. For any graphG , there exists a connected allocation with egalitarian welfare at least
1
2n−1 . On the other hand, there exists a graph G and identical valuations of the agents such that any
connected allocation yields egalitarian welfare at most 12n−1 .
Proof. Let α := 12n−1 . To show the second part of the theorem, letG be a star with 2n − 1 edges
such that every agent values each edge exactly α , and the value is distributed uniformly within
the edge. Assume for contradiction that there is a connected allocation with egalitarian welfare
strictly greater than α . Consider any agent i . The agent must receive intervals from at least two
edges, and these intervals must be connected via the center vertex. Note that the unallocated parts
of these edges cannot be allocated to other agents, since any agent who receives an interval from
such a part cannot receive intervals from other edges and would therefore obtain value less than
α . Hence, at least two edges are only allocated to agent i . However, this means that there must be
at least 2n edges in total, a contradiction.
We now prove the first part of the theorem. LetG be an arbitrary graph.We will show that there
exists a moving-knife algorithm that produces a connected allocation with egalitarian welfare at
least α . We proceed by induction on n; the statement trivially holds for n = 1 since we can simply
allocate the entire cake to the only agent. Assume that the statement holds for n − 1 agents, and
consider an instance with n agents.
First, we claim that we can turn G into a tree. As long as G contains at least one cycle, pick
an edge uv that belongs to a cycle, add a new vertex v ′, and replace this edge by an edge uv ′
while keeping the remaining edges of the graph as before. Since at least one cycle is removed by
this operation and no new cycle is created,G eventually becomes a tree. Note that any connected
allocation of the modified graph is a connected allocation in the original graphwith the same value
for every agent, so it suffices to prove the theorem for the modified graph.
Choose an arbitrary vertex u of the tree G as its root. Let v be a vertex such that the subtree
rooted atv yields value at least α to some agent, and the same does not hold for the subtree rooted
at any child of v . Letw1, . . . ,wk be the children of v . We consider two cases:
• Case 1: At least one of the k branches ofv along with the corresponding subtree yields value
at least α to some agent. Assume without loss of generality that the branch containing w1
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is one such branch. By our assumption, the subtree rooted at w1 yields value less than α
to all agents. Hence, by moving a knife from w1 to v , we can find the point x closest to w1
such that some agent i values the interval [w1, x] together with the subtree rooted at w1
exactly α , and all other agents value this piece of cake at most α . We allocate this piece of
cake to agent i , and make x a new vertex in the remaining graph, which has value at least
1−α for each of the remaining agents. By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a connected
allocation of the remaining graph to the n − 1 agents such that every agent receives value at
least 12n−3 · (1 − α) =
1
2n−3 ·
2n−2
2n−1 > α , as desired.
• Case 2: Every branch of v along with the corresponding subtree yields value less than α to
all agents. Let t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,k} be the smallest number such that the first t branches and
their subtrees together yield value at least α to some agent i . We allocate this piece of cake
to agent i . For every other agent, the first t − 1 branches is worth less than α and the tth
branch is also worth less than α , so the piece of cake allocated to agent i is worth less than
2α . By the inductive hypothesis, there exists a connected allocation of the remaining graph
to the n − 1 agents such that every agent receives value at least 12n−3 · (1 − 2α) =
1
2n−1 = α ,
as desired.
The two cases together complete the induction. 
Note that by following the algorithm in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we also obtain the following
statement, which will be useful for our later results.
Lemma 3.2. LetH be a connected piece of cake in a graphG , and suppose that all agents have value
x for H . For any α ≤ x , there exists a partition of H into two connected pieces such that one of the
agents has value at least α for the first piece, while all of the remaining agents have value at most 2α
for this piece.
3.2 Stars
For certain graphs, it is possible to improve upon the guarantee provided by Theorem 3.1—an obvi-
ous example is the graph consisting of a single edge, for which the Dubins-Spanier protocol yields
an egalitarian welfare of at least 1/n. We now derive the optimal egalitarian welfare guarantee in
the case where the graph is a star. For integers n ≥ 2 and k ≥ 3, define
f (n,k) =

1
n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 1
for k < 2n − 1;
1
2n − 1
for k ≥ 2n − 1.
Theorem 3.3. Let n ≥ 2 and k ≥ 3, and let G be a star with k edges. There exists a connected
allocation with egalitarian welfare at least f (n,k). Moreover, the bound f (n,k) is tight.
The values of f (n,k) for small n and k are shown in Table 1.
Proof. We proceed by induction on n. For the base case n = 2, the lower bound of 1/3 follows
from Theorem 3.1. To see that 1/3 is also an upper bound, assume that both agents value three of
the edges uniformly at exactly 1/3 and have no value for the remaining k−3 edges. Any connected
allocation with egalitarian welfare greater than 1/3 would give rise to a connected allocation of a
three-edge star with egalitarian welfare greater than 1/3, which by Theorem 3.1 does not exist.
Assume that the statement holds for n − 1 agents. First, we show that there exists a connected
allocation with egalitarian welfare at least f (n,k). If k ≥ 2n − 1, this follows immediately from
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that k ≤ 2n − 2. We have n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 1 ≥ n + k/2 − 1 ≥ k+22 +
k
2 − 1 = k , or
f (n,k) ≤ 1/k . Hence, every agent has value at least f (n,k) for some edge of the star. We choose
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n ↓| k → 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
2 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
3 1/4 1/4 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5 1/5
4 1/5 1/5 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
5 1/6 1/6 1/7 1/7 1/8 1/8 1/9 1/9 1/9
6 1/7 1/7 1/8 1/8 1/9 1/9 1/10 1/10 1/11
7 1/8 1/8 1/9 1/9 1/10 1/10 1/11 1/11 1/12
8 1/9 1/9 1/10 1/10 1/11 1/11 1/12 1/12 1/13
9 1/10 1/10 1/11 1/11 1/12 1/12 1/13 1/13 1/14
10 1/11 1/11 1/12 1/12 1/13 1/13 1/14 1/14 1/15
Table 1. Some values of f (n,k), the best egalitarian welfare guarantee for n agents and a star with k edges.
one such edge for an arbitrary agent and move a knife from its outer endpoint to the center of
the star, stopping when the covered part has value f (n,k) for some agent i . We allocate this piece
of cake to agent i , and make the cut point a new vertex in the remaining graph, which has value
at least 1 − f (n,k) for each of the remaining agents. The remaining graph is still a star with k
edges (possibly with a degenerate edge), so by the inductive hypothesis, there exists a connected
allocation of the remaining graph to the n − 1 agents with egalitarian welfare at least
f (n − 1,k) · (1 − f (n,k)) =
1
n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 2
·
n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 2
n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 1
=
1
n + ⌈k/2⌉ − 1
,
where the first equality follows from the observation that f (n− 1,k) = 1
n+ ⌈k/2⌉−2 for all k ≤ 2n− 2.
Next, we show that f (n,k) is tight for all n and k . If k ≥ 2n− 1, this follows from the instance in
Theorem 3.1 and by adding extra edges of zero value. Suppose that k ≤ 2n − 2 and that the agents
have identical valuations. Each agent has value f (n,k) for k −1 of the edges and 1−(k−1) · f (n,k)
for the kth edge, and the values are distributed uniformly across each edge. Note that as in the
preceding paragraph, we have f (n,k) ≤ 1/k , and therefore 1 − (k − 1) · f (n,k) ≥ f (n,k). Assume
for contradiction that there is a connected allocation with egalitarian welfare strictly greater than
f (n,k). Any agent must either receive intervals from at least two edges (perhaps including the kth
edge), or only receive an interval from the kth edge. The number of agents of the first type is at
most ⌊k/2⌋. The number of agents of the second type is strictly less than
1 − (k − 1)f (n,k)
f (n,k)
=
n−⌊k/2⌋
n+ ⌈k/2⌉−1
1
n+ ⌈k/2⌉−1
= n − ⌊k/2⌋.
This means that the total number of agents is strictly less than ⌊k/2⌋ + (n − ⌊k/2⌋) = n, yielding
the desired contradiction. 
4 TWO AGENTS
In this section, we focus on the case of two agents. We establish the optimal egalitarian welfare
that can be obtained for each graph and derive utility frontiers when the agents may have different
entitlements. In addition, we explore the extent to which our guarantees can be improved if we
allow more than one connected piece per agent, and also consider approximate equitability.
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4.1 Graph-Specific Guarantees
Before we can state our results for specific graphs, we need some graph-theoretic terminology.
Recall that a bridge of a graph is an edge that is not contained in any cycle. A graph is said to be
bridgeless if it contains no bridges.
Definition 4.1. A graph is said to be almost bridgeless if we can add an edge so that the resulting
graph is bridgeless.
Note that according to this definition, every connected bridgeless graph with at least two ver-
tices is also almost bridgeless, since we can add a copy of an existing edge.
Next, we define an oriented labeling of a graph.
Definition 4.2. An oriented labeling of a graph with m edges is a labeling of the edges with
numbers 1, 2, . . . ,m, using each number exactly once, together with a labeling of one endpoint of
each edge i with i− and the other endpoint with i+ (so each vertex receives a number of labels
equal to the number of edges adjacent to it). An oriented labeling is said to be contiguous if:
• For each 2 ≤ i ≤ m, the edges labeled 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 form a connected subgraph, and the
vertex labeled i− belongs to one of these edges.
• For each 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the edges labeled i + 1, i + 2, . . . ,m form a connected subgraph, and
the vertex labeled i+ belongs to one of these edges.
It turns out that a graph admitting a contiguous oriented labeling is equivalent to it being almost
bridgeless.
Lemma 4.3. A graph is almost bridgeless if and only if it admits a contiguous oriented labeling.
Proof. (⇐) Assume that a graph admits a contiguous oriented labeling. Add an edge between
the vertices labeled 1− andm+. We claim that the resulting graph is bridgeless. Since the vertices
1− andm+ are connected in the original graph, the new edge is part of a cycle. Now, consider any
edge in the original graph; assume that the edge has label i . The vertices 1− and i− are connected
by a path that only goes through edges between 1 and i − 1. Likewise, the vertices i+ andm+ are
connected by a path that only goes through edges between i + 1 andm. Hence, the edge i belongs
to a cycle that goes through the two paths, the edge betweenm+ and 1−, and itself.
(⇒) Assume that a graph is almost bridgeless. We will label all edges with labels 1, 2, . . . ,m and
orient each edge in one direction (the source of edge i corresponds to the vertex i− and the sink to
the vertex i+) so that the labeling is a contiguous oriented labeling.
Suppose that the graph becomes bridgeless if we add an edge uv . Consider a path from u to
v , and sort the edges and orient them along this path. We will iteratively construct ears until all
edges are used. Each ear is a path starting at a vertex of a previous ear and ending at a vertex of a
previous ear (possibly the same as the former vertex, in which case the path becomes a cycle) but
not going through any other vertex of a previous ear; the only exception is the first ear, which is
the path from u to v . Suppose that we have constructed some ears, and not all edges have been
used. If there are edges that connect only vertices in the existing ears, we make each such edge
into a new ear. If some edges still remain after this process, then since the graph is connected,
there must be an edge xy such that x belongs to an existing ear but y does not. By assumption,
xy is contained in a cycle if the edge uv is added, so we can follow the edges in this cycle until
we reach a vertex z in an existing ear for the first time (possibly z = x ). Since we stop if we reach
either u or v , edge uv cannot be part of this trail, so we have a new ear. Assume without loss of
generality that either x = u, or the first edge directed into x appears no later than the first edge
directed into z in the current edge order, or both. Orient the edges of the new ear along the trail
from x to z. If x = u, insert these edges consecutively at the beginning of the order. Else, insert
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them consecutively after the first edge directed into x . After all edges have been added, label them
from 1 tom according to the final order. Observe that the edge with label 1 is always adjacent to
u, and the edge with labelm is always adjacent to v .
We claim that the resulting oriented labeling is contiguous. First, we show that for each 1 ≤ i ≤
m, the edges labeled 1, 2, . . . , i form a connected subgraph. We proceed by induction on i , with the
base case i = 1 holding trivially. Assume that the edges 1, 2, . . . , i − 1 form a connected subgraph
for some i ≥ 2. If edge i is not the first edge in its ear, its predecessor in its ear has label at most
i − 1, so the induction hypothesis implies that the edges 1, 2, . . . , i form a connected subgraph.
Moreover, in this case, vertex i− belongs to the predecessor edge with label at most i − 1. Suppose
now that edge i is the first edge in its ear, and assume that the edge is directed from x to y. If x = u,
then since i ≥ 2, the edge with label 1 is an edge with a lower label that is adjacent to u. Else, the
first edge directed into x has label at most i − 1. In either case, the induction hypothesis implies
that the edges 1, 2, . . . , i form a connected subgraph, and vertex i− = x is adjacent to a vertex with
label at most i − 1. This completes the induction and moreover shows that for each 2 ≤ i ≤ m,
vertex i− belongs to one of the edges 1, 2, . . . , i − 1.
Next, we show that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, the edges labeled i, i + 1, . . . ,m form a connected
subgraph. We proceed by downward induction on i , with the base case i = m holding trivially.
Assume that the edges i +1, i +2, . . . ,m form a connected subgraph for some i <m. If edge i is not
the last edge in its ear, its successor in its ear has label at least i + 1, so the induction hypothesis
implies that the edges i, i + 1, . . . ,m form a connected subgraph. Moreover, in this case, vertex i+
belongs to the successor edge with label at least i + 1. Suppose now that edge i is the last edge in
its ear, and assume that the edge is directed from y to z. If z = v , then since i < m, the edge with
labelm is an edge with a higher label that is adjacent to v . Suppose that z , v , which also implies
that i does not belong to the first ear. Consider the moment when we insert the ear that contains
i , and assume that this ear begins at vertex x . If x = u, then the edges of this ear are placed at the
beginning of the order; since z appears in a previous ear, there is an edge adjacent to it that comes
after edgeyz in the order. Suppose therefore that x , u, so that at the moment before we insert the
ear containing i , the first edge into x appears no later than the first edge directed into z in the order.
We place the edges of the new ear after the first edge into x . If x , z, there is an edge adjacent to z
that comes after this ear in the order. Else, x = z, and this vertex is different fromu andv . Consider
the earliest ear that contains z, and note that in this ear, there is an edge into z and another edge
out of z; let i1 and i2 be the label of the two edges respectively. The first edge into z appears no
later than i1, so the ear containing i appears before i2 in the ordering. Hence, there is an edge with
label at least i + 1 adjacent to z. This completes the induction. It also follows from our argument
that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, the vertex i+ belongs to one of the edges i + 1, i + 2, . . . ,m. Combined
with the previous paragraph, we find that our oriented labeling is contiguous, as claimed. 
Given a graph G with k vertices, a bipolar numbering of G is a labeling of the vertices with
numbers 1, 2, . . . ,k , with each number used exactly once, such that every vertex with label greater
than 1 has a neighbor with a smaller label and each vertex with label smaller than k has a neighbor
with a larger label. Bilò et al. [6] characterized the class of graphs that admit a bipolar numbering
as the graphs with the property that if the vertices of the graph represent indivisible items of
possibly different values to the two agents, there always exists a connected ‘envy-free up to one
item’ allocation. We show that the class of graphs that admit a bipolar numbering forms a strict
subclass of the almost bridgeless graphs (which, by Lemma 4.3, is equivalent to the class of graphs
that admit a contiguous oriented labeling).
Proposition 4.4. Any graph that admits a bipolar numbering is almost bridgeless, but the converse
does not hold.
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Proof. Assume that a graph admits a bipolar numbering with the vertices labeled 1, 2, . . . ,k .
This means that for any vertex i , there exists a path from 1 to i that only goes through vertices
1, 2, . . . , i , and a path from i to k that only goes through vertices i, i+1, . . . ,k . Add an edge between
vertices 1 and k . We will show that the resulting graph is bridgeless, i.e., every edge is contained
in a cycle. This is clear for the new edge. For any edge in the original graph between vertices i and
j with i < j , we can construct a cycle containing it by following a path from j to k that only uses
vertices j, j + 1, . . . ,k , traversing the added edge from k to 1, and following a path from 1 to i that
only uses vertices 1, 2, . . . , i .
To show that the converse does not hold, consider the graphs shown in Figure 1. Since every edge
in both graphs is contained in a cycle, both graphs are bridgeless and therefore almost bridgeless.
On the other hand, one can check that neither graph admits a bipolar numbering. 
Fig. 1. Examples of graphs that are almost bridgeless but do not admit a bipolar numbering.
We are now ready to show our classification result: the optimal egalitarian welfare that can
always be obtained for a graph is 1/2 if the graph is almost bridgeless, and 1/3 otherwise. The
former is shown in Theorem 4.5, while the latter follows from Theorems 3.1 and 4.7.
Theorem 4.5. For n = 2 and any almost bridgeless graphG , there exists a connected proportional
allocation.
Proof. Suppose that G is almost bridgeless. By Lemma 4.3, it admits a contiguous oriented
labeling. We move a knife over the edges ofG in increasing order of the label. For each edge with
label i , the knife goes from vertex i− to vertex i+. If the knife is currently on edge i , we stop when
the piece of cake containing edges 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, together with the interval of edge i between i−
and the current position of the knife, yields value exactly 1/2 to one of the agents. We allocate
this piece of cake to the agent who receives value 1/2, and the remainder of the cake to the other
agent. Both agents receive value at least 1/2 and, by definition of the labeling, obtain a connected
allocation of the cake. 
Lemma 4.6. Let F be a nonempty set of bridges in a graph. If no path contains all bridges in F , there
exist three bridges in F such that no path contains all three bridges.
Proof. Assume that no path contains all bridges in F . Since bridges are not contained in cycles,
there is a spanning tree T that contains F . Let T ′ be a minimal subtree of T that contains F . Since
T ′ cannot be a path, it has a vertex v with degree at least 3. Each of the (at least three) branches of
v must contain a bridge from F—otherwise the branch can be removed to obtain a smaller subtree
thanT ′.
Let e1, e2, e3 be bridges contained in three distinct branches. Suppose for contradiction that they
are contained in a path. By reversing the direction of the path if necessary, we may assume that
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the path traverses at least two of the edges away from v with respect to T ′. Assume further that
two of these edges are e1 and e2, and that the path traverses e1 before e2. After traversing e1, the
path must reach another vertex w in T ′ that lies on the same side as v with respect to both e1 and
e2 (possibly the endpoint of e1 or e2 closer to v). By combining the portion of the path from e1 to
w with the path in T ′ fromw to e1, we find that e1 lies on a cycle, a contradiction. 
Theorem 4.7. For n = 2 and any graphG that is not almost bridgeless, there exist identical valua-
tion functions of the two agents such that any connected allocation yields egalitarian welfare at most
1/3.
Proof. Suppose that G is not almost bridgeless. Then no path can contain all bridges of G: if
there exists such a path, we can eliminate all bridges by adding an edge that connects the endpoints
of this path. By Lemma 4.6, there exist three bridges of G such that no path contains all three
bridges. For each of the three bridges, the other two bridges must lie on the same side of it, since
otherwise we can construct a path that contains all three bridges.
Assume that both agents value each of the three bridges exactly 1/3 (and every other edge 0),
and the value is distributed uniformly within each bridge. Suppose for contradiction that there
exists a connected allocation with egalitarian welfare strictly greater than 1/3. This means that
each agent must receive intervals from at least two bridges. However, when an agent receives
intervals from two bridges, each interval must contain the endpoint of the bridge that is on the
same side as the other two bridges. This is impossible since there are only three bridges, yielding
the desired contradiction. 
4.2 Utility Frontiers
In this subsection, we establish the frontiers of the utilities that we can guarantee to the two agents
regardless of the graph, assuming that the agents may have different entitlements. We begin by
observing that the cut-and-choose protocol allows us to find an allocation that gives utility 1/2 to
the first agent and 1/3 to the second agent; this generalizes the case n = 2 of Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 4.8. For n = 2 and any graph G , there exists a connected allocation such that the first
agent receives value at least 1/2 and the second agent receives value at least 1/3.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, there exists a partition of the cake into two connected pieces such that
the second agent values both pieces at least 1/3. The first agent can then simply choose the piece
that she prefers and obtain value at least 1/2. 
The next proposition follows from Theorem 3.1.
Proposition 4.9. For n = 2, there exists a graphG and identical valuations of the two agents such
that any connected allocation yields egalitarian welfare at most 1/3.
To complete the utility frontier, we show that if we are required to give a utility of more than 1/2
to the first agent, it may be impossible to provide any nontrivial guarantee for the second agent.
Proposition 4.10. Let α > 1/2 and β > 0. There exists an instance with n = 2 such that no
connected allocation yields value at least α to the first agent and at least β to the second agent.
Proof. Fix α > 1/2 and β > 0, and assume that G consists of a single edge represented by the
interval [0, 1]. Suppose that the first agent values the entire interval [0, 1] uniformly, while the
second agent values the interval [1−α ,α] uniformly and nothing else. In any connected allocation
that yields value at least α to the first agent, this agent must receive the entire interval [1 − α ,α].
However, that means the second agent receives value 0 from the allocation. 
Xiaohui Bei and Warut Suksompong 11
Combining Theorem 4.8 with Propositions 4.9 and 4.10, we find that the values of (α , β) for
which a connected allocation that yields utility α to the first agent and β to the second agent
always exists are as shown in Figure 2.
0 11/21/3
α
β
1
1/2
1/3
Fig. 2. The red region corresponds to the values of (α , β) such that in any instance with two agents, there
exists a connected allocation that yields utility α to the first agent and β to the second agent.
While Figure 1 completely captures the shares that can be guaranteed to the two agents, if we do
not fix the entitlements of the agents in advance, it is possible to achieve better guarantees. As an
example, consider the casewhere the graphG consists of a single edge. In this case, Proposition 4.10
shows that any entitlements (α , β)with α > 1/2 and β > 0 cannot be achieved. On the other hand,
for any α ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to give one agent a value of at least α and the other agent a value
of at least 1 − α (while not fixing which agent receives which share). Indeed, if we run a moving
knife on the single edge and stop when the part already covered by the knife yields value α to
some agent, the two pieces can be allocated to yield the desired guarantee. In what follows, we
determine all shares (α , β) for which there always exists a connected allocation that yields value α
to one agent and β to the other agent regardless of the graph. Note that Theorem 4.8 carries over,
and so does Proposition 4.9 since it holds for agents with identical valuations. We fill in the utility
frontier, starting with the negative results.
Proposition 4.11. Let α > 1/2 and β > 1/4. There exists an instance with n = 2 and identical
valuations such that no connected allocation yields value at least α to one agent and at least β to the
other agent.
Proof. Let G be a star with four edges such that every agent values each edge exactly 1/4,
and the value is distributed uniformly within the edge. Assume for contradiction that there is a
connected allocation that yields value at least α to one agent and at least β to the other agent;
since the agents have identical valuations, we may assume without loss of generality that these
are agents 1 and 2 respectively. Agent 1 must receive intervals from at least three edges, and these
intervals must be connected via the center vertex. Note that the unallocated parts of these edges
cannot be allocated to agent 2, since agent 2 would receive value less than 1/4. Similarly, agent 2
must receive intervals from at least two edges, and these intervals, which again must be connected
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via the center vertex, cannot be allocated to agent 1. However, this means that there must be at
least five edges in total, a contradiction. 
1 − 4α + 4ϵ
α −
ϵ
α −
ϵ α − ϵ
α − ϵ
Fig. 3. GraphG in the proof of Proposition 4.12.
Proposition 4.12. Let α ≤ 1/4 and β > 1 − 2α . There exists an instance with n = 2 and identical
valuations such that no connected allocation yields value at least α to one agent and at least β to the
other agent.
Proof. Choose ϵ > 0 such that β > 1 − 2α + 2ϵ . Let G be the graph shown in Figure 3, where
the value of each agent for each edge is as shown in the figure and distributed uniformly across
the edge. Assume for contradiction that there is a connected allocation that yields value at least
α to one agent and at least β to the other agent; since the agents have identical valuations, we
may assume without loss of generality that these are agents 1 and 2 respectively. Agent 2 must
receive part of the middle edge; otherwise she has value at most 2(α − ϵ) < 1/2 < β . Moreover,
she must receive part of some left edge and part of some right edge; otherwise she has value at
most 2(α − ϵ) + (1 − 4α + 4ϵ) = 1 − 2α + 2ϵ < β . Hence, the agent must receive the entire middle
edge. This means that agent 1 can receive intervals from only one non-middle edge. Her value is
therefore at most α − ϵ , a contradiction. 
We nowmove on to the positive result, which shows the additional guarantee that we can obtain
if we give up control over which agent receives which entitlement.
Theorem 4.13. Let α ≤ 1/4. For n = 2 and any graph G , there exists a connected allocation such
that one agent receives value at least α and the other agent receives value at least 1 − 2α .
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3.2 by taking H to be the entire graphG . 
Combining Theorem 4.13 with Propositions 4.11 and 4.12, we find that the values of (α , β) for
which a connected allocation that yields utility α to one agent and β to the other agent always
exists are as shown in Figure 4.
4.3 Beyond One Connected Piece
As we mentioned in the introduction, one important motivation for considering connected alloca-
tions is to avoid situations where an agent receives a “union of crumbs”. In light of this motivation,
it is interesting to explore whether we can obtain improved guarantees if we allow the agents to
receive a small number of connected pieces. We demonstrate in this subsection that such improve-
ments are indeed possible by presenting a tight bound of 12 −
1
2·3k
on the egalitarian welfare that
can be guaranteedwhen a total of k+1 connected pieces are permitted.We first establish the lower
bound.
Theorem 4.14. Let k be a positive integer. For n = 2 and any graph G , there exists an allocation
in which the two agents receive a total of at most k + 1 connected pieces and the egalitarian welfare
is at least 12 −
1
2·3k
.
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α
β
1
1/2
1/3
1/4
Fig. 4. The blue region corresponds to the values of (α , β) such that in any instance with two agents, there
exists a connected allocation that yields utility α to one agent and β to the other agent.
Proof. LetG be an arbitrary graph. It suffices to show that there exists a partition ofG into two
parts with at most k + 1 connected pieces in total such that both parts yield value at least 12 −
1
2·3k
to the first agent. Indeed, given such a partition, we can let the second agent choose the part that
she prefers and obtain value at least 1/2. We therefore consider only the first agent from now on.
We proceed by induction on k; the base case k = 1 follows from Theorem 4.8. Suppose that the
statement holds for k − 1, i.e., there exists a partition ofG into two parts with at most k connected
pieces in total such that both parts yield value at least 12 −
1
2·3k−1
to the agent. Assume without
loss of generality that the second part has value at least 1/2, so the first part has value 12 − x for
some 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2·3k−1
. Since the second part consists of at most k − 1 connected pieces, it contains
a connected piece of value at least 12k−2 . Denote this piece by H .
Since 2k − 2 ≤ 3k , we have 2x3 ≤
1
3k
≤ 12k−2 . By creating a duplicate of our agent and applying
Lemma 3.2, we can partition H into two connected pieces in such a way that our agent has value
in the range [ 2x3 ,
4x
3 ] for the first piece. Move this piece from the second part of our partition ofG
to the first part. The resulting partition ofG consists of at most k +1 connected pieces in total, and
the first part of this partition has value in the range [ 12 −
x
3 ,
1
2 +
x
3 ]. This implies that both parts of
the partition yield value at least 12 −
x
3 ≥
1
2 −
1
2·3k
, completing the induction. 
Next, we show that the bound established in Theorem 4.14 is tight for every k . First we need
the following technical lemma.
Lemma 4.15. Let t be a positive integer, and let a1,a2, . . . ,at be (not necessarily distinct) integers
and ε1, ε2, . . . , εt ∈ {±1,±2}. Thenε1 · 3a1 + ε2 · 3a2 + · · · + εt · 3at − 12
 ≥ 12 · 3t .
Proof. We proceed by strong induction on t . The base case t = 1 follows from the observation
that the terms of the form ε · 3a closest to 1/2 are 1/3 and 2/3, and |1/3− 1/2| = |2/3− 1/2| = 1/6.
Suppose that the statement holds up to t − 1, and assume without loss of generality that a1 ≥ a2 ≥
· · · ≥ at . We process the sum ε1 · 3
a1
+ ε2 · 3
a2
+ · · · + εt · 3
at from right to left. Consider the
moment when we process terms involving 3a . If there are two terms involving 3a with coefficients
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of opposite signs, we either cancel them or combine them into one term. So we may assume that
all terms with 3a have the same sign, say positive. If there are two terms 1 · 3a , we combine them
into 2 · 3a ; if there is a term 1 · 3a and 2 · 3a , we combine them into 1 · 3a+1; and if there are two
terms 2 · 3a , we replace them with 1 · 3a and 1 · 3a+1. Our operations do not increase the number
of terms, so our procedure terminates with at most one term involving each power of 3.
If the number of terms ε ·3a is now less than t , wemay apply the induction hypothesis and obtain
our desired conclusion. Assume therefore that the number of terms is still t , anda1 > a2 > · · · > at .
We have 
t∑
i=2
εi · 3
ai
 ≤
t∑
i=2
|εi · 3
ai | ≤ 2 ·
t∑
i=2
3ai < 2 ·
∞∑
i=2
3ai = 3a2+1 ≤ 3a1 .
If ε1 is negative, we have
∑t
i=1 εi · 3
ai < −3a1 + 3a1 = 0, so the desired statement holds. Assume
now that ε1 is positive. If a1 ≤ −2, we have
∑t
i=1 εi · 3
ai ≤ 2 · 3a1 + 3a1 = 3a1+1 ≤ 1/3, so the desired
statement holds in this case.
Suppose that a1 = −1. If ε1 = 1, we have
t∑
i=1
εi · 3
ai −
1
2
 =

t∑
i=2
εi · 3
ai −
1
6
 = 13

t∑
i=2
εi · 3
ai+1 −
1
2
 ≥ 13 · 12 · 3t−1 = 12 · 3t ,
where the inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis. Similarly, if ε1 = 2, we have
t∑
i=1
εi · 3
ai −
1
2
 =

t∑
i=2
εi · 3
ai
+
1
6
 = 13

t∑
i=2
(−εi ) · 3
ai+1 −
1
2
 ≥ 13 · 12 · 3t−1 = 12 · 3t .
Suppose now that a1 = 0. If ε1 = 1, we have
t∑
i=1
εi · 3
ai −
1
2
 =

t∑
i=2
εi · 3
ai
+
1
2
 =

t∑
i=2
(−εi ) · 3
ai −
1
2
 ≥ 12 · 3t−1 > 12 · 3t ,
where the first inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis. If ε1 = 2, we have
∑t
i=1 εi · 3
ai ≥
2 − 23 −
2
9 − · · · = 1, so the desired statement holds.
Finally, suppose that a1 ≥ 1. If ε1 = 2, we have
∑t
i=1 εi · 3
ai ≥ 3ai
(
2 − 23 −
2
9 − . . .
)
≥ 3, so
the desired statement holds. Assume now that ε1 = 1. If a2 = a1 − 1 and ε2 is negative, we may
combine the terms 1 · 3a1 and ε2 · 3
a2 into (3 + ε2) · 3
a2 and apply the induction hypothesis. So
we may assume that either a2 ≤ a1 − 2 or ε2 is positive. In either case, we have
∑t
i=1 εi · 3
ai ≥
3a1
(
1 − 29 −
2
27 − . . .
)
= 3a1 · 23 ≥ 2, so the desired statement again holds. 
Theorem 4.16. Let k be a positive integer. There exists an instance with n = 2 and identical val-
uations such that any allocation in which the two agents receive a total of at most k + 1 connected
pieces yields egalitarian welfare at most 12 −
1
2·3k
.
Proof. Let G be a rooted tree with k + 2 layers, where the first layer consists only of the root
of the tree. The root has one child, and every vertex in subsequent layers up to the (k + 1)st layer
has three children. In particular, the (k + 2)nd layer consists of 3k leaves. The tree G for the case
k = 2 is shown in Figure 5. Suppose that both agents value each edge adjacent to a leaf exactly
1/3k with the value distributed uniformly within the edge, and do not value any other edge.
Consider an arbitrary allocation in which the two agents receive a total of at most k + 1 con-
nected pieces. We will show that the egalitarian welfare is at most 12 −
1
2·3k
. If there are unallocated
parts of the cake, we arbitrarily allocate these parts so that the number of connected pieces that
each agent receives does not increase; this does not lower the egalitarian welfare of the allocation.
Hence we may assume that the entire cake is allocated (i.e., the allocation is complete). Denote
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Fig. 5. The graph G in the proof of Theorem 4.16 for k = 2.
by X1, . . . ,Xp the connected pieces that agent 1 receives, and Y1, . . . ,Yq the connected pieces that
agent 2 receives, where p + q ≤ k + 1. We assume that each edge has length 1, and refer to the
distance along the (unique) path between two points in G simply as the distance between these
two points. Note that every connected piece has a unique point closest to the root: if there are two
such points, they must be connected via a point that is strictly closer to the root than both of them.
For every connected piece Z , denote by wz the unique point in Z closest to the root and u(Z ) the
utility of the piece Z . We will define a connected piece Z ∗ as follows:
• Ifwz is not a vertex ofG , let Z
∗ be the set of pointsw such that the path fromw to the root
goes throughwz . In other words, Z
∗ is the part of the tree “below” wz .
• Ifwz is a vertex ofG , let Z
∗ be the set of pointsw such that the intersection of Z and the path
from w to the root has nonzero measure. Equivalently, Z ∗ consists of the edges adjacent to
wz that have a nontrivial overlap with Z , along with everything “below” these edges.
Assume without loss of generality that agent 1 receives a piece containing the root of the tree.
We claim that u(X1) + · · · + u(Xp) = [u(X
∗
1 ) + · · · + u(X
∗
p)] − [u(Y
∗
1 ) + · · · + u(Y
∗
q )]. First, note
that for each Z ∗ where Z ∈ {X1, . . . ,Xp ,Y1, . . . ,Yq}, every connected piece Xi and Yi is either
contained in Z ∗ in its entirety or not at all. Hence u(Z ∗) can be written as a sum of distinct u(Xi )’s
and u(Yi )’s. Moreover, one can verify from the definition that a connected piece Z is contained in
W ∗ if and only if Z =W or the path fromwz to the root has a nontrivial overlap withW . This path
alternates between pieces Xi and Yi and ends with a piece Xi . Therefore, each u(Xi ) is contained
in u(X ∗1 )+ · · ·+u(X
∗
p) exactly once more than in u(Y
∗
1 )+ · · ·+u(Y
∗
q ), while each u(Yi ) is contained
in the two sums an equal number of times. This yields the claimed equality.
Next, observe that each u(Z ∗) can be written as 3s/3k for some nonnegative integer s ≤ k , or
2 · 3s/3k for some nonnegative integer s ≤ k − 1, or δ/3k for some δ ∈ [0, 1]. Note also that since
agent 1 receives a piece containing the root of the tree, for this piece Xi we have u(X
∗
i ) = 1. It
follows that [u(X ∗1 ) + · · · +u(X
∗
p)] − [u(Y
∗
1 ) + · · · + u(Y
∗
q )] can be written as 1 − (S + ∆), where S is
a sum of a number of terms (say, r terms, where r ≤ k) of the form ε · 3a with ε ∈ {±1,±2} and a
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an integer, and |∆| ≤ (k − r )/3k . Hence, letting d :=
u(X1) + · · · + u(Xp) − 12 , we have
d =
 ([u(X ∗1 ) + · · · + u(X ∗p)] − [u(Y ∗1 ) + · · · + u(Y ∗q )]) − 12

=
(S + ∆) − 12
 ≥
S − 12
 − |∆|
≥
1
2 · 3r
−
k − r
3k
=
3k−r − 2(k − r )
2 · 3k
≥
1
2 · 3k
,
where the first inequality follows from the triangle inequality, the second inequality follows from
Lemma 4.15, and the last inequality holds since 3b ≥ 2b + 1 for any integer b ≥ 0. This implies
that the egalitarian welfare is at most 12 −
1
2·3k
, as claimed. 
Recall that the height of a rooted tree is the length of the longest path from the root to a leaf
vertex. For example, a star rooted at the center vertex has height 1. Our next theorem shows that
for graphs that can be represented as a tree of height at most 2, we can obtain full proportionality
provided that we allow two connected pieces per agent.
u
v1 v2 v3 v4
Fig. 6. Example of a graph G in the proof of Theorem 4.17.
Theorem 4.17. Forn = 2 and any graphG that can be represented as a rooted tree of height at most
2, there exists a proportional allocation such that each agent receives at most two connected pieces.
Proof. Let G be a rooted tree with root u, and let v1, . . . ,vk be the children of u (see Figure 6).
We move the knife in the following order: For i = 1, 2, . . . ,k , we move the knife from vi down to
its first child, from vi down to its second child, and so on until we reach its last child, then from
vi up to u. This process ensures that the knife goes through all edges ofG . We stop when the part
already covered by the knife is worth 1/2 to one of the agents. We allocate the covered part of the
cake to that agent, and the remaining part to the other agent.
Clearly, the resulting allocation is proportional; it remains to show that each agent receives at
most two connected pieces. We consider two cases:
• Case 1: The knife stops on its way from a vertex vi to its childw (possibly atw). This means
that the first i − 1 branches of the tree have been covered, and they are connected throughu.
Moreover, the covered part in the ith branch are connected through vi . Hence the covered
part forms two connected pieces of the cake. The uncovered part in the ith branch besides
the edge viw is connected through vi , and it is connected to the remaining uncovered part
from the (i + 1)st branch onwards through u. The uncovered part of the edgeviw forms one
connected piece. It follows that both agents receive at most two connected pieces.
• Case 2: The knife stops on its way from a vertex vi to the root u (possibly at u). The same
argument as in Case 1 shows that the covered part forms two connected pieces of the cake.
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The uncovered part in the ith branch is contained in the edge viu, and it is connected to the
remaining uncovered part from the (i + 1)st branch onwards through u. It follows that both
agents receive at most two connected pieces.
The two cases together complete the proof. 
4.4 Equitability
We end this section by briefly considering another well-established fairness notion: equitability.
Interestingly, while for approximate proportionality it is useful to consider the maximum among
the agents’ values for the current piece (Theorem 3.1), for approximate equitability in the case of
two agents, the appropriate quantity to consider is the sum of these values. Note that an empty
allocation is always equitable but yields the lowest possible welfare of zero, so we are interested
in complete allocations.
Theorem 4.18. For n = 2 and any graphG , there exists a complete and connected allocation with
inequity at most 1/3. Moreover, the bound 1/3 is tight.
Proof. To show tightness, let G be a star with three edges such that every agent values each
edge exactly 1/3, and the value is distributed uniformly within the edge. In any complete and
connected allocation, one of the agents must receive two full edges (and possibly part of the third).
This implies that the inequity in such an allocation is at least 1/3.
We now prove the first part of the theorem. Let G be an arbitrary graph. Our goal is to find
a complete, connected allocation (A1,A2) such that | f1(A1) − f2(A2)| ≤ 1/3. Since the allocation
is complete, we may write f2(A2) = 1 − f2(A1). The desired condition can be rewritten as 2/3 ≤
f1(A1)+ f2(A1) ≤ 4/3. We use a similar procedure as in Theorem 3.1, turning the graph into a tree
and considering a minimal subtree that has value at least 2/3 with respect to f1+ f2. We stop either
when the knife cuts a subtreeA1 such that f1(A1)+ f2(A1) = 2/3 (Case 1), or when a set of branches
A1 satisfies f1(A1) + f2(A1) ≥ 2/3 for the first time (Case 2). An analogous argument shows that
we must have f1(A1) + f2(A1) ≤ 2/3 + 2/3 = 4/3, which yields the desired inequality. 
5 CHORE DIVISION
In this section, we assume that the graph represents a chore, i.e., an item that yields negative value
to the agents. This models, for example, a situation where we wish to divide the responsibilities
of maintaining a road or cable network.
For the case of two agents, all results in cake cutting (Section 4) can be translated to analogous
results in chore division using a simple reduction. The idea is that given a chore instance, we can
turn it into a cake instance by pretending that the cost functions are cake valuation functions, ap-
plying a result in the cake setting to obtain an initial allocation of the chore, and having the agents
swap their assigned piece to arrive at the final allocation. This reduction works for translating
positive results to the chore setting. For negative results, we can use the reduction in the oppo-
site direction, starting from a chore instance and reducing it to a cake instance. As an illustrating
example, we show how to deduce an analogue of Theorem 4.8 in the chore setting.
Theorem 5.1. In chore division, for n = 2 and any graph G , there exists a connected allocation
such that the first agent incurs cost at most 1/2 and the second agent incurs cost at most 2/3.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary chore division instance. If we treat the chore valuations as cake
valuations, then by Theorem 4.8, there exists a (complete) connected allocation such that the first
agent receives value at least 1/2 and the second agent receives value at least 1/3. Let the agents
swap their assigned pieces in this allocation. In the resulting allocation, which is also connected,
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the first agent incurs cost at most 1− 1/2 = 1/2 and the second agent incurs cost at most 1− 1/3 =
2/3. 
When there are more than two agents, the relationship between the cake and the chore setting
becomes much less clear, and we do not know how to translate results from one setting to the
other. In the chore setting, we show that for each n, the egalitarian cost may need to be as high as
2
n+1 .
Proposition 5.2. In chore division, there exists a graph G and identical valuations of the agents
such that any connected allocation yields egalitarian cost at least 2
n+1 .
Proof. LetG be a star with n+1 edges such that every agent has cost exactly 1
n+1 for each edge,
and the cost is distributed uniformly within the edge. Assume for contradiction that there is a
connected allocation with egalitarian cost strictly less than 2
n+1 . Let v1, . . . ,vn+1 be the endpoints
of the edges different from the center of the star. For each i , some agent must be allocated a piece
containing vi . If an agent receives a piece containing two endpoints, she incurs cost at least
2
n+1 ,
which is impossible. So every agent’s piece contains at most one endpointvi . However, since there
are n agents and n + 1 endpoints, some endpoint is left unallocated, a contradiction. 
The bound 2n+1 is tight for n = 2 due to Theorem 5.1. Next, we show that it remains tight as long
as n ≤ 5. A simpler protocol for the case n = 3 is given in Appendix A.
Theorem 5.3. In chore division, for n ≤ 5 and any graph G , there exists a connected allocation
with egalitarian cost at most 2n+1 .
Proof. We proceed by strong induction on n; the case n = 1 is trivial while the case n = 2
follows from Theorem 5.1. Let 3 ≤ n ≤ 5. For an arbitrary piece of chore, let c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn be
the costs of the agents for the piece in increasing order. We define two conditions that the piece
may satisfy:
• Condition 1: c1 ≤
1
n+1 , and ci ≤
i−1
n+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . ,n.
• Condition 2: ci >
i+1
n+1 for i = 1, 2, . . . ,n − 1, and cn >
n
n+1 .
We turn the graph G into a tree as in Theorem 3.1. Choose an arbitrary vertex u of the tree G
as its root. Let v be a vertex such that the subtree rooted at v does not satisfy Condition 1, but the
subtree rooted at any child of v does. Letw1, . . . ,wk be the children of v . We consider two cases:
• Case 1: At least one of the k branches of v along with the corresponding subtree does not
satisfy Condition 1. Assume without loss of generality that the branch containingw1 is one
such branch. By our assumption, the subtree rooted at w1 satisfies Condition 1. Hence, by
moving a knife from w1 to v , we can find the point x such that if we consider the interval
[w1, x] together with the subtree rooted at w1 as a subtree rooted at x , at least one of the
inequalities in Condition 1 is tight for this subtree and the remaining inequalities still hold.
Assume that for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,n, agent j has cost c j for this subtree.
Suppose that the inequality involving ci is tight. If i = 1, we allocate this subtree to agent 1,
who incurs cost 1
n+1 . The rest of the chore has cost at most
n
n+1 to the remaining agents,
and by the inductive hypothesis, it can be allocated in a connected manner to these agents
so that each agent incurs cost at most 2
n
· n
n+1 =
2
n+1 . Suppose now that i ≥ 2. This means
that ci =
i−1
n+1 . The subtree has cost at most
i−1
n+1 to the first i − 1 agents. By the inductive
hypothesis, it can be allocated in a connected manner to these agents so that each agent
incurs cost at most 2
i
· i−1
n+1 <
2
n+1 . The rest of the chore has cost at most
n−i+2
n+1 to the remaining
n − i + 1 agents. By the inductive hypothesis, it can be allocated in a connected manner to
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these agents so that each agent incurs cost at most 2n−i+2 ·
n−i+2
n+1 =
2
n+1 . Hence we have a
connected allocation with egalitarian cost at most 2
n+1 .
• Case 2: Every branch of v along with the corresponding subtree satisfies Condition 1. Let
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,k} be the smallest number such that the first t branches and their subtrees
together, which we denote by T , do not satisfy Condition 1. In particular, the first t − 1
branches and their subtrees together, which we denote by T1, satisfy Condition 1, and the
tth branch and its subtree together, which we denote by T2, also satisfy this condition.
We claim that T does not satisfy Condition 2. Assume for contradiction that the opposite is
true. Let a1 ≤ · · · ≤ an be the costs of the agents forT1 in increasing order, and b1 ≤ · · · ≤ bn
be the corresponding costs forT2. By Condition 1, we have a1 ≤
1
n+1 and ai ≤
i−1
n+1 for i ≥ 2;
analogous upper bounds hold for the bi ’s. In order for a sum ai + bj to be strictly greater
than rn+1 for some positive integer r , the upper bounds of ai and bj must add up to at least
r+1
n+1 . Hence, in order for Condition 2 to be satisfied, we must have
2
(
1
n + 1
+
n−1∑
i=1
i
n + 1
)
≥
n+1∑
i=3
i
n + 1
+
n + 1
n + 1
.
Multiplying both sides by n + 1, this is equivalent to
2 + (n − 1)n ≥
(n + 1)(n + 2)
2
− 3 + (n + 1),
or (n − 1)(n − 6) ≥ 0, which is false for 4 ≤ n ≤ 5. So T does not satisfy Condition 2.
Recall that T does not satisfy Condition 1. Let c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn be the costs of the agents for T
in increasing order, and let i be the smallest index for which the inequality involving ci in
Condition 1 fails. If i ≥ 2, we may proceed as in Case 1 by allocatingT to the first i−1 agents
and the rest of the chore to the remaining n − i + 1 agents. So we may assume that i = 1, i.e.,
c1 ≥
1
n+1 . Next, let j be the smallest index forwhich the inequality involving c j in Condition 2
fails. Since cn ≥ cn−1, we have j < n. This means that cr >
r+1
n+1 for r = 1, 2, . . . , j − 1 and
c j ≤
j+1
n+1 . Hence, T has cost at most
j+1
n+1 to the first j agents. By the inductive hypothesis,
it can be allocated in a connected manner to these agents so that each agent incurs cost at
most 2
j+1 ·
j+1
n+1 =
2
n+1 . If j ≥ 2, then since c j−1 >
j
n+1 , the rest of the chore has cost at most
n−j+1
n+1 to the remaining n − j agents. If j = 1, we know that c1 ≥
1
n+1 , and so the rest of
the chore has cost at most nn+1 =
n−j+1
n+1 to the remaining n − 1 agents. In either case, by the
inductive hypothesis, the rest of the chore can be allocated in a connected manner to these
agents so that each agent incurs cost at most 2n−j+1 ·
n−j+1
n+1 =
2
n+1 . Hence we again have a
connected allocation with egalitarian cost at most 2n+1 .
The two cases together complete the proof. 
We conjecture that the bound 2n+1 is tight for all n, and leave it as an intriguing open question.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we introduce and study a generalized version of the classical cake-cutting problem,
where the cake can be represented by an arbitrary graph instead of an interval.We establish bounds
on the utilities that can be guaranteed to the agents for various classes of graphs, both for cake
cutting and chore division, and demonstrate in several cases that our guarantees are tight. We also
show that better guarantees are possible if we allow more connected pieces per agent, and exhibit
an algorithm that computes an approximately equitable allocation.
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Our work opens up a number of new directions for future research. Besides proportionality and
equitability, another prominent fairness notion is envy-freeness, which stipulates that no agent
prefers another agent’s bundle to her own in the allocation. In the case of two agents, envy-freeness
and proportionality are equivalent, and approximate proportionality bounds readily translate to
corresponding approximate envy-freeness results. However, this equivalence ceases to hold when
there are more than two agents. If the graph consists of a single edge, a connected envy-free
allocation always exists for any number of agents [22]. It would be interesting to see whether one
can obtain (approximate) envy-freeness guarantees for different classes of graphs.
Like in the vast majority of the fair division literature, we assume in this paper that all parts of
the resource either yield nonnegative utility to every agent (cake cutting) or nonpositive utility to
every agent (chore division). Recently, Bogomolnaia et al. [7] and Segal-Halevi [18] considered a
generalizationwhere an agentmay have positive utility for some parts of the resource and negative
utility for other parts, and different agents may have different evaluations. Aziz et al. [3] showed
the existence of a connected proportional allocation in this general setting when the resource is
represented by an interval. Again, extending this result to more complex graphs is an appealing
direction that we leave for future work.
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A CHORE DIVISION PROTOCOL FOR THREE AGENTS
Proposition A.1. In chore division, for n = 3 and any graphG , there exists a connected allocation
with egalitarian cost at most 1/2.
Proof. Pick two arbitrary agents. By Theorem 5.1, there exists a connected allocation to the two
agents such that the first agent incurs cost at most 1/2 and the second agent incurs cost at most 2/3.
Fix the piece assigned to the first agent, and divide the piece assigned to the second agent further
between the second and third agents. By Theorem 5.1 again, there exists a connected allocation of
the latter piece such that the third agent incurs cost at most 1/2 and the second agent incurs cost
at most 2/3 × 2/3 = 4/9 < 1/2. Hence the egalitarian cost of the resulting allocation is at most
1/2. 
